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On November 7, 2006 the Homeland Security and Defense Education Consortium 
(HSDEC), the University of Texas San Antonio (UTSA), and East Carolina University 
(ECU) sponsored a homeland security education and training workshop on “Preparing 
for and Responding to Disasters in North America.” The workshop was hosted by the 
UTSA Institute for the Protection of American Communities (IPAC) at the UTSA 
downtown campus in San Antonio, TX. HSDEC is co-sponsored by North American 
Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Northern Command (NORAD-USNORTHCOM (N-
NC)), and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense for the 
purpose of facilitating the development of Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland 
Defense (HLD) education in America’s colleges and universities, and facilitating liaison 
between government and academia on government interests in the areas of HLS and 
HLD. The HSDEC program is administered under contract by the National Security 
Division of the Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio. Panelists included 
representatives from UTSA, ECU, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
N-NC, the Canadian Defense Academy, U.S. Army North, the Texas National Guard, and 
several Texas state and local agencies. The fundamental question at issue was what 
challenges face the three North American states in the event of disasters that cross state 
borders or that create conditions that put pressure on the inter-state borders. The three 
panels convened at the workshop addressed disasters of different character, but each of 
which could either affect both sides of a political border simultaneously or create 
pressures on political borders such as population migrations stimulated by disaster. The 
panels focused on natural disaster, as exemplified by Hurricane Katrina; a disease 
pandemic; and a terrorist attack. 
Opening remarks by UTSA President Ricardo Romo set the tone for the workshop at 
the outset, declaring that “natural disasters do not know borders.” As an example, he 
said that Hurricane Katrina did not choose a path to hit the state or location best 
prepared to handle the fury of the storm. Mr. Bear McConnell, director of interagency 
coordination at N-NC and representing the command, offered the observation that the 
three North American countries each had multiple streams by which to respond to 
disaster, and that academia offered an avenue by which to approach combining and 
coordinating those individual streams which have not as yet been effectively 
coordinated.  
LTG Chuck Rodriguez, Texas adjutant general, delivered the keynote address for the 
workshop. General Rodriguez illuminated the dual nature of successful response in 
science and art, or, as he further elaborated, doctrine and wit. Doctrine provides the 
standard operating procedures from which wit and imagination can depart in response 
to non-standard situations. A second major consideration to account for in response 
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situations, he argued, is the divergence between actual response times and perceived 
response requirements. The gap between first response and post-first response exists in 
the area of perception, if not in actuality. In many cases the actual response flows 
seamlessly, if less publicly, from the more public face of the first response. Among 
response tenets, then, the public face of response is extraordinarily important regardless 
of how well the preparation and response effort is progressing on the ground. Finally, 
Gen. Rodriguez described the organizational challenge facing state National Guard 
organizations in a joint, interagency, and now also multinational, response coordination 
environment. Texas is meeting this challenge by utilizing the NORTHCOM adaptive 
battle staff concept to achieve cross-cutting benefits instead of relying on a traditional 
stove-piped staff organization. 
A second major presentation was delivered by LTG Robert T. Clark, Commanding 
General, ARNORTH. Gen. Clark discussed the transition of his command from 5th 
Army, a mobilization command, to ARNORTH, the Army Component Command for 
NORTHCOM.  He also described the operations ARNORTH had already participated in 
during its short existence, as well as the creation of two mobile Operational Command 
Posts capable of responding to disasters anywhere in the NORTHCOM Area of 
Responsibility and designed to facilitate the integration of federal systems and 
personnel with existing state and local resources. Even though the command has only 
been fully operational since October of 2006, it participated in the space shuttle 
Columbia recovery effort and supports an ongoing commitment for subsequent shuttle 
launches. At present the command only has the resources to provide two fully functional 
and simultaneously active mobile command posts to support any needs for Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities or homeland defense response activities. 
PANEL ONE 
Panel One addressed the specific case of Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, cross-
border implications for future events along the border. Katrina provided a recent 
example of the challenges presented by a natural disaster such as a hurricane occurring 
in a border region. The panel chair, LTG (Ret) Lawson Magruder – UTSA, executive 
director, Institute for the Protection of American Communities, introduced the panel 
with a recitation of some of the significant effects of Hurricane Katrina. Among the 
effects briefed by General Magruder were: 
• 1,330 people died 
• Impacted 93,000 square miles across 138 parishes and counties 
• Hurricane force winds extended 103 miles from its center 
• Storm surge crested at twenty-seven feet 
• 80 percent of New Orleans was flooded and the city considered destroyed 
• Eighty miles across Mississippi’s Gulf Coast were destroyed 
• 118 million cubic yards of debris left behind 
• Storm devastated the regional power infrastructure in Louisiana, Mississippi 
and Alabama; 2.5 million people were without power 
• Ten major oil spills; 7.4 million gallons poured into the Gulf 
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In addition to this, some $97 billion in damages to goods and property occurred. 
Mr. Michael Lowder briefed the response capabilities and organization of FEMA, as well 
as lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Critical lessons learned by FEMA included 
the need to: 
• Improve ability to define the common operating picture 
• Improve overall situational awareness and communications 
• Improve visibility of actions and resource tracking 
• Improve operational response team and disaster workforce capabilities 
• Enhance Headquarters and Regional disaster response capabilities (NRCC, 
RRCC) 
• Improve operational procedures and documentation 
• Complete a strategic review of logistics capabilities to develop an all-hazards 
national footprint as part of implementing a state-of-the-art logistics support 
system  
• Ensure better inter-agency and regional coordination  
• Enhance catastrophic planning 
The recommendations included in this list were cited repeatedly by the other panel 
members from their own or their organization’s experience with Katrina, and focused 
significantly on refinement of information flow and control as well as fostering greater 
situational awareness across response organizations.  
The importance of the learning points from Katrina is magnified by the sheer scope of 
the event. Katrina response resulted in a number of firsts for FEMA, which included the 
following: 
• FIRST time the U.S. government evacuated U.S. citizens on U.S. soil 
• FIRST use of the National Defense Reserve Fleet 
• FIRST use of all National Defense Medical System (NDMS) components in 
response to a Catastrophic Event 
• FIRST use of NDMS patient evacuation system for a mass casualty event in 
U.S.   
• FIRST time all twenty-eight Urban Search & Rescue Task Forces deployed  
• FIRST time mandatory evacuation ordered in New Orleans 
• FIRST time foreign nations (130 nations) offered aide to U.S. disaster victims  
The magnitude of Katrina taxed the existing planning, preparation, and organization of 
disaster response across the board, which tended to highlight gaps, seams, and 
deficiencies in the existing system, particularly in the areas of coordination and 
information management. 
The interagency coordination ramifications of a catastrophic event on the magnitude 
of Katrina were discussed by Mr. Bear McConnell. As the head of the Interagency 
Coordination Directorate at USNORTHCOM, Mr. McConnell occupies a unique 
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position, in that USNORTHCOM is very unusual among DoD commands in having such 
a directorate.  The nature of the command necessitates such an unusual step, and may 
provide a model for other DoD commands to follow in the future. Among the lessons 
learned from Katrina in the interagency world are: 
• Emergency preparedness and response has traditionally involved civil-
military relationships, especially in catastrophic events; 
• International interagency coordination activities must be integrated into an 
overall Command Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) strategy – a  maturing 
process; and 
• Offers of international assistance highlighted interagency gaps and seams, 
leading to the creation of an International Assistance Manual 
All this boiled down to one essential lesson for interagency coordination practitioners: 
“When you need a friend, it is too late to make one.” 
BG Mark Graham, Deputy Commanding General, ARNORTH, emphasized the 
importance of developing a common operational picture (COP), maintaining 
compatibility between high- and low-tech systems and increasing the efficient use of 
abundant resources. According to General Graham, shortage of resources was not a 
problem in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Aid, he said, came from all directions and 
sources, using all modes of transportation. The difficulties arose in conveying 
information regarding the availability and location of those resources. This paradox – of 
scarcity in proximity to abundance – highlights the need for a common operating 
picture (COP) shared among responders and across organizational and jurisdictional 
boundaries. Such a COP must be supported by agreed data standards in order to convey 
an overall understanding of what is actually happening. The diversity of existing 
systems, as well as the challenge of harsh conditions that can overcome high-tech 
systems and solutions, require that standards be created to accommodate more 
primitive technology. In catastrophic conditions, the only available solutions may be 
more primitive and lower-tech than those fielded by responding units. 
Captain Richard Gravel, Canadian Navy, and Director of Programmes at the 
Canadian Forces College, recounted his experience leading a Canadian maritime effort 
to assist the U.S. after Katrina, designated Operation Unison. He emphasized the 
importance of unity of command, or “having one dog to kick,” following his experience 
working to integrate with maritime-based relief efforts in the area effected by Katrina. 
Once again, abundant resources were available, but delivery of those resources was 
stymied by inefficiencies in command, control, and communications. Capt. Gravel 
recommended a “Whole of Government Approach” on the order of the recently 
established lead ministry in Canada – Public Security and Emergency Preparedness 
Canada (PSEPC).  
Dr. Hector Gonzalez, Health Director, City of Laredo, described the success of the 
City of Laredo in achieving remarkable cross-border cooperation on medical issues. Dr. 
Gonzalez did not speak directly about the response to Hurricane Katrina, but rather 
about the ongoing and challenging task of coordinating health response across a very 
busy commercial border crossing. The border environment creates particular challenges 
for the fulfillment of typical public health responsibilities such as: 
• Preventing epidemics and spread of disease, 
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• Protecting against environmental hazards, 
• Preventing  injury, 
• Promoting healthy behaviors and mental health, 
• Responding to disasters and assist communities in recovery,  
• Assuring quality and accessibility of health services, and 
• Maintaining surveillance 
Despite those challenges, the City of Laredo, in cooperation with Nuevo Laredo across 
the international border, has achieved a remarkable level of coordination on public 
health matters. Although public health is only one of many challenging areas for 
international cooperation, the success achieved on the local level between the two 
Laredos offers reason for optimism. 
PANEL TWO 
The second panel, Preparing for the Avian Flu Pandemic was chaired by Captain James 
Terbush, USNORTHCOM Surgeon General, and dealt with the challenge and prospect 
of dealing with a pandemic disease catastrophe. Capt. Terbush introduced the panel by 
remarking that epidemics change civilizations (most of us have at least one ancestor 
who died as a result of an epidemic) and strong public health leadership taking timely 
action has been the key in the past to the success of communities that escaped the 
effects of an epidemic. 
Dr. Chuck Bauer, University of Texas Health Science Center, introduced the range 
and variety of coordination vehicles in the south Texas area. There are multiple 
separate, but overlapping, coordinating organizations which have fostered a very 
successful environment of working together.  He specifically highlighted the role of the 
Regional Medical Operations Center (RMOC) in distributing patients to available 
hospitals to handle surge requirements and the necessity of stockpiling supplies in 
advance of need. The probability of another flu pandemic is not at issue; the question is 
in the timing. Despite a robust medical response network, and organizational response 
planning, significant work remains to be done in terms of analyzing the potential effects 
of a pandemic event on the public, business, and the medical response communities. 
Some of the areas in which significant preparation is still required include: 
• Impact on Business 
• Impact on employees and customers 
• Policies to be implemented during a pandemic 
• Allocation of resources for the protection of employees and customers during 
a pandemic 
• Communication and education for employees 
• Coordination with external organizations and community assistance. 
The threat of a flu pandemic posed by avian flu was specifically addressed by Dr. Cherise 
Rohr-Allegrini, from San Antonio Metro Health. Dr. Rohr-Allegrini was at pains to 
clarify that avian flu is not pandemic influenza. A significant alteration in current avian 
ROBINSON, 2006 HDSEC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 (2007), WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
 
6 
flu would have to occur to make it more threatening to the human population as a 
potential pandemic. While there is no pandemic, there is the significant enough threat of 
one to justify planning against the possibility. Preparedness and prevention are the keys 
to success in the face of a pandemic, and this requires public awareness. The key goals of 
pandemic response include: 
• Minimizing serious illness, hospitalizations, and mortality 
• Preserving critical infrastructure 
• Minimizing social disruption  
There is currently a severe shortage of facilities to handle a pandemic-type event. 
Medicines, in particular, will be in short supply and likely to be distributed on a priority 
basis. 
 
Dr. Waldo Lopez, City of Laredo, discussed the ramifications, on a national scale, of 
local events. Specifically, three events at the border in Laredo had national 
ramifications: detention of three Cuban nationals with suspected smallpox; a possible 
terrorist incursion at one of the bridge crossings; and detention of six Chinese illegals 
with SARS.  In each case, established relationships and cross-border organizations were 
instrumental in containing the incident at the local level. The border environment 
introduces greater opportunity for local incidents to rise to a level of national 
significance. Still, the main activity is the routine of planning, coordinating, and 
exercising for the catastrophic circumstance, while maintaining a normal level of 
medical care in the face of resource constraints. The three main components of response 
to a pandemic event, which may be magnified in the border environment, are: 
availability of flu vaccine, control of the population, and prevention. Lack of adequate 
levels of resources force prioritization; the amount of commerce that traverses the 
border in Laredo magnifies the population control challenge; and the education efforts 
necessary to prevention are compounded by the fluid mixing of populations from each 
side of the border.  
PANEL THREE 
The third panel, Catastrophic Terrorism at the Borders, dealt with an intentional, man-
made catastrophe rather than one of natural origins. The panel was led by Dr. Richard J. 
Kilroy, Jr., assistant professor, Political Science and Security Studies, ECU. 
Dr. Abelardo Rodriguez, research associate at the Center for North American 
Strategic Studies, Mexico, discussed the past record of U.S.-Mexican security 
cooperation. He addressed changes occurring within Mexico regarding foreign policy 
and national security policy.  Since 2000, an internal debate has been occurring over a 
possible shift in focus from internal security toward external security and foreign policy 
which may facilitate improved cooperation between the two countries on matters of 
common interest regarding security and response to natural and non-natural disasters. 
Recent actions taken by the United States in response to the 9-11 terrorist attacks, such 
as the creation of Northern Command, have challenged the improving situation by 
creating perceptions in Mexico of United States’ goals to dominate the hemisphere in 
the interest of her own security. The opportunity exists to achieve greater cooperation 
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with Mexico after the 9-11 attacks, since Mexico perceived the attacks as a threat to their 
security as well. 
Dr. Lee Maril, from ECU, presented findings from research he has done on the 
sociological ethnography of the U.S.-Mexico border. The border today he described as a 
place of: 
• Mass flows of undocumented workers 
• Mass suffering 
• Mass drug smuggling 
• Many other types of crime and smuggling, running both ways 
In response to these conditions, he looked at the available means of addressing the 
problems. Specifically, he looked at existing and potential border issues through the lens 
of the Border Patrol, the organization charged with border security.  He argued that the 
Border Patrol suffers from dysfunctional attitudes and processes that result in the 
misuse of resources already in short supply, and that the response to a cross-border 
terrorist incident would evidence the same characteristics. An increase in border 
security following a terrorist incident would likely decrease the flow of drugs, but do 
little or nothing to reduce the level of pain and suffering on the border. He 
recommended a focus on the human element to develop higher quality agents, better 
designed equipment for use in the field, and better developed personal relationships 
with counterparts across the border. 
Dr. Todd Hataley, from the Royal Military College of Canada, discussed the Canadian 
perspective on catastrophic terrorism at the borders. His emphasis was on the trade 
effects of any incident that could result in border closure for security reasons. The 
border trade is critical to Canada; 82 percent of the country’s trade goes south across the 
border. The majority of that trade crosses four main bridges.  Severing four bridges 
could shut down the American auto industry in Michigan and cripple the Canadian 
economy.  Political shutdown of the crossings for security or health reasons would have 
the same effect.  Additionally, there are significant law enforcement issues that affect the 
border and require considerable coordination and cooperation: cigarette smuggling that 
is an important funding source for Hezbollah; high-volume marijuana smuggling in 
British Columbia; and human smuggling are examples of law enforcement challenges at 
the borders that not only tax normal law enforcement procedures, but also levy an 
increased requirement for intelligence gathering to make law enforcement efforts 
successful. Information sharing across the border can be critical to success in such 
situations.. 
Professor Jeff Addicott, director of the St. Mary’s Center for Terrorism Law 
(introduced as the only center of its kind) contrasted the terrorism problems at the 
borders, north and south. While there is considerable potential for terrorist infiltration 
in the south, the only known incident occurred at the northern border, with two 
additional disrupted plans for cross-border terrorism occurring in Canada in 2003 and 
2006.  On both borders, there is increased cooperation through a variety of programs. 
Specifically, on the border with Canada where known incursion attempts have taken 
place, increased patrols and the institution of PSEPC represent significant attempts to 
address the challenges of countering terrorist activity at the border. Increased 
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cooperation and intelligence gathering are key to preventing future cross-border 
terrorist attacks. 
Throughout the day, consistent themes emerged from each presentation. Perhaps the 
single most important theme was the need for accurate development, fusion, analysis, 
and distribution of information. Whether dealing with a natural, medical, or terrorist 
incident, the need for that information – to direct the response to and recovery from the 
incident – is critical. As the panel on Hurricane Katrina pointed out, even in a resource-
rich environment, effective response and recovery can be severely inhibited by poor 
information and control. The panel on medical response illuminated the greater 
challenge to be faced in a resource-constrained environment. Even adequate planning, 
organization, and preparation will be challenged in the face of a flu pandemic just by the 
time needed to create, manufacture, and distribute a vaccine for the pandemic flu strain. 
Finally, in the case of a terrorist event, each of these challenges can be magnified by the 
secrecy and surprise utilized by terrorists to mask their intentions. The paucity of 
specific information puts a premium on intelligence, the development of information, 
and flexibility to implement standard operating procedures in response to a surprise 
event. 
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